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Abstract—Communication in wireless sensor networks uses
the majority of a sensor’s limited energy. Using aggregation
in wireless sensor network reduces the overall communication
cost. Security in wireless sensor networks entails many different
challenges. Traditional end-to-end security is not suitable for
use with in-network aggregation. A corrupted sensor has access
to the data and can falsify results. Additively homomorphic
encryption allows for aggregation of encrypted values, with the
result being the same as the result when unencrypted data was
aggregated. Using public key cryptography, digital signatures
can be used to achieve integrity. We propose a new algorithm
using homomorphic encryption and additive digital signatures to
achieve conﬁdentiality, integrity and availability for in-network
aggregation in wireless sensor networks. We prove that our digital
signature algorithm which is based on the Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is as secure as ECDSA.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) are self-organizing net-
works of small, battery powered sensors used to monitor the
environment for events such as forest ﬁres, pollutant levels or
enemy troop movements. A large number of small, battery
powered computing devices with built-in radios are spread
over the area to be monitored. Upon activation, these sensors
self-organize into a multi-hop network, which connects to the
users via a powerful base station in order to achieve a common
goal [1]. As each sensor surveys the area within its sensing
range, the data is sent towards the base station along a multi-
hop path. A WSN is able to remotely cover a large sensing
area since these low-cost sensors organize into a multi-hop
network without human assistance.
Since sensors are typically battery powered and a WSN
contains thousands of sensors, replacing the batteries is not a
possibility. In terms of energy usage, communication is much
more expensive than any internal computations [2]. In in-
network aggregation, intermediate results are calculated along
the multi-hop path whenever two or more messages are routed
along the same path. Depending on the routing structure,
energy savings may be by as much as eight times [3].
Security in WSNs includes conﬁdentiality, integrity and
availability. Conﬁdentiality in sensor networks is accomplished
by preventing outsiders from eavesdropping on transmissions.
This is generally achieved by encrypting the relevant parts
of a packet. Integrity in general means that the receiver is
assured that the packet was not tampered with or the message
altered in some way. By ensuring availability we mean that
the data is available in a timely fashion so that it is useful to
the user. Availability in sensor networks is of great concern to
the user of the network. Unfortunately, many existing security
primitives can not be used in sensor networks, either because
the computing power of the sensors is too limited or the
additional work created by the protocols causes excessive
network trafﬁc [4].
Sensors in the network can become corrupted due to the en-
vironment such as water, wind or sand acting on the sensor. In
hostile environments, a sensor may deliberately be corrupted
by an attacker. A corrupted sensor may appear to participate
in the mission of the network but falsify sensor readings,
improperly apply an aggregation function, exclude legitimate
messages from the aggregate result or create a ﬁctitious result.
A sensor corrupted by an attacker may behave in this way in
order to get the base station to accept an incorrect result that is
favorable to the attacker. Hence in order to securely aggregate
data in a sensor network, we must not only provide protection
against eavesdroppers, but we should also prevent intermediate
sensors from having access to the data.
Homomorphic encryption schemes are one possibility of
ensuring secure aggregation, as they allow data aggregation to
be performed on encrypted data. Encryption and decryption
operations are computationally very expensive and time con-
suming. In link-layer cryptography [5], the data is encrypted
by the sender, decrypted at intermediate nodes, the aggregation
function is applied and the result is encrypted again before
being sent to the next hop; this can lead to overﬂowing queues.
In homomorphic encryption certain aggregation functions such
as sum and average can be calculated on the encrypted
data, reducing the workload of the sensors in the network
signiﬁcantly. The data is encrypted and sent toward the base
station, while sensors along the path apply the aggregation
function on the encrypted data. The base station receives the
encrypted aggregate result and decrypts it. In section II we
describe the scheme of homomorphic encryption in detail.
Homomorphic encryption schemes provide security against
eavesdroppers and protect the aggregate result from being
known by intermediate, possibly corrupted sensors.
Integrity of the aggregate result can easily be achieved on a
hop-by-hop basis in wireless sensor networks. Achieving end-
to-end integrity while allowing for data aggregation provides
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integrity when data aggregation is applied. In aggregation
integrity implies that any aggregate result is made up of
only legitimate data without inclusions or additions, and that
corrupted sensors can not interfere with operations of the
aggregation. We want to be able to assure the base station
that the aggregate result it receives is a fair representation of
the network state.
In this paper we introduce a novel way to provide conﬁ-
dential and integrity preserving aggregation in wireless sensor
networks. In section III we propose the use of homomorphic
encryption in WSN in order to achieve:
￿ A solution for conﬁdentially calculating the SUM and
AVERAGE in a wireless sensor network. Our algorithm
is present in Section IV.
￿ A solution for integrity preserving data aggregation in
wireless sensor networks. We are using an additively
digital signature algorithm based on ECDSA to achieve
integrity of the aggregate result. We provide security
analysis of the algorithm in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND
In sensor networks, data aggregation provides energy sav-
ings. The lifetime of most networks is limited and it is impor-
tant for protocols to be energy-efﬁcient. Combining multiple
payloads into one message or combining data by allowing
for in-network calculation of aggregates leads to these energy
savings [6].
In many proposed applications of wireless sensor networks,
the networks generate large amounts of data in a continuous
stream, making it difﬁcult for a user to sift useful information
from these masses of data [7]. Sensors may generate a reading
of their environment every three seconds until the mission
is completed; for a 100 sensor network, this would generate
300 messages every three seconds, or 6000 messages every
minute. In-network aggregation can take this amount of data
and combine it into one or more aggregated results every
minute.
Calculating aggregate results such as SUM or AVERAGE
is of special interest to sensor networks. Wireless sensor
networks are designed to provide large amounts of data,
which is a snapshot of the environment at one point in time.
Combining several readings by calculating the AVERAGE or
the SUM increases the accuracy of these readings [8].
Security in sensor networks requires new approaches due to
the limitations of sensors and their limited computing power.
Since a sensor network uses radio as the communication
medium, all communications are inherently insecure. Anybody
tuned to the same channel is able to eavesdrop on the trans-
missions. Many sensor network applications demand secure
communications. Encryption is the preferred way to provide
for a secure communication channel. Encryption ensures that
only the sender and the intended receiver can read the message
contents [9]. Traditional link-layer cryptography is an impor-
tant part of an overall security strategy for sensor networks.
TinySec [5], an implementation of link-layer cryptography
for TinyOS, has two operational modes: hop-by-hop (HBH)
and end-to-end (ETE). ETE provides total security, as only
the sender and the receiving base station are able to know
the content of the message. Unfortunately, this also means
that aggregation is not possible, because the intermediate
nodes can not access the payload. TinySec uses the SkipJack
cipher, which does not allow for calculating of aggregate
functions such as SUM or AVERAGE on encrypted data.
When TinySec is used in HBH mode instead, the message
is decrypted at each hop, and aggregation is possible. Due to
the amount of time required for the encryption and decryption
operations, the queues in a WSN can overﬂow, leading to
dropped packets. Other drawbacks are that TinySec is based
on private key cryptography, which leads to problems such as
key distribution, key management, and that digital signatures
are not possible [10].
In private key cryptography, both parties use the same key.
Deciding when and how two sensors agree on which key to
use is a big challenge. A private key cryptography approach
also means that a sensor needs to store one key for every other
sensor it wishes to communicate with. In WSN, the topology
of the network can change, and protocols need to be ﬂexible
enough to allow for two previously unassociated sensors to
begin communicating securely. One possible solution is a
network-wide key, but the obvious problem with this approach
is that only one corrupted sensor is required to compromise
communications in the entire network.
Since all parties in private key cryptography use the same
key, digital signatures are not feasible. In order to achieve
integrity Message Authentication Codes (MACs) are used.
MACs are used to prove that the message has not been
tampered with. Since sender and receiver share the same key,
it can not be proven who sent the message. A public key
cryptography approach addresses many of these problems [11].
Public key cryptography allows for the application of digital
signatures. Digital signatures provide integrity and repudiation.
Only the party in possession of the private key can create
a particular signature. When a message with a signature is
received, the corresponding public key is used to verify the
signature. Once the signature is veriﬁed, the receiver can be
certain that the integrity of the message has not been breached.
The receiver is also certain that only the sender in possession
of the private key could have created that signature.
Homomorphic encryption is a cryptographic technique
which allows calculations to be performed on aggregate data.
Speciﬁcally, a homomorphic encryption scheme allows the
following property to hold:
enc(a ⊕ b)=enc(a) ⊕ enc(b).
This means that in order to calculate the SUM of two values,
we can apply some function to their encrypted counterparts
and then decrypt the result of the SUM operation. Clearly,
considering the cost of encryption and decryption, homomor-
phic encryption is useful in wireless sensor networks, because
homomorphic encryption would allow for the calculation of
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be encrypted at the sensor node, the SUM or AVERAGE
would be calculated as the aggregate result follows a path
to the base station, and the ﬁnal result would be decrypted
at the base station. Any eavesdropper would be unable to
gather information from the transmissions. Any corrupted
sensor could not know the aggregate result. An example of
an homomorphic cryptography scheme is the elliptic curve
ElGamal system [12]. The EC ElGamal system is additively
homomorphic because the following property holds:
enc(a + b)=enc(a)+enc(b)
.
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) employs the points on
an elliptic curve over a ﬁnite ﬁeld K. The required algorithms
for elliptic curve cryptography can easily be implemented,
even on small devices such as sensors [13]. Elliptic curve
cryptography uses the analog of the discrete logarithm problem
(DLP), also known as the elliptic curve discrete logarithm
problem (EC-DLP). The DLP over elliptic curves is believed
to be computationally much more difﬁcult than DLP over ﬁnite
ﬁelds of the same size [10].
Homomorphic encryption does not provide integrity. Since
we are using public key elliptic curve cryptography, we will
use digital signatures to provide integrity. Digital signature
schemes are not homomorphic. That is two signatures gen-
erated on two different messages can not be combined to
verify the sum of the messages. We propose the use of
an encryption scheme which will allow for homomorphic
signature generation and veriﬁcation.
III. APPROACH
We propose to use the EC-ElGamal system for homo-
morphic encryption in wireless sensor networks. In [11] the
authors evaluated several public key homomorphic encryption
schemes for use on sensors. The authors in [14] use an im-
plementation of the EC-ElGamal algorithms for homomorphic
encryption and storage in sensor networks. The EC-ElGamal
system is thus clearly suitable for wireless sensor networks.
Instead of applying EC-EG (EC-ElGamal) for persistent data
storage, we propose to use it for homomorphic data encryption
during transmission. The work in [14] provides for data
conﬁdentiality only. We propose the use of elliptic curve
digital signatures to provide message integrity and integrity
of the aggregate in addition to data conﬁdentiality.
We will now provide an explanation of the example in
Figure 1. Each node generates a reading. The reading is signed
with the aggregate signature protocol using the node’s private
key; this is shown as Sig(x). Each node homomorphically
encrypts the reading with the base station’s public key; this
is shown as Enc(x) in Figure 1. The node sends the secured
reading, the signature and its public key to its parent. After re-
ceiving messages from all its children, the parent combines the
messages into one. The parent sums the secured readings, the
signatures and the public keys. If the parent also contributes a
reading, that reading is treated like any other reading. These
are shown as SUM−ENC, SUM−SIG and SUM−KEY
in Figure 1. This process is repeated by each parent along the
path to the base station.
The base station decrypts the received message. The sum
of the readings was homomorphically encrypted with the base
stations public key. This allows the base station to decrypt the
readings. Only the base station which is in possession of the
matching private key is able to decrypt the readings. This is
shown as Dec(Enc(x)) in the ﬁgure. Each node signed its
messages, and these signatures were combined along the way.
The base station can now verify the sum of the signatures given
the sum of the public keys. The aggregate signature protocol
ensures that only readings from legitimate sensors are included
in the aggregate.
IV. ALGORITHMIC DETAILS
We ﬁrst describe the details for the algorithm executed at the
sensors. Each sensor is pre-loaded with the appropriate elliptic
curve parameters, the base stations’ public key and a network
wide random integer. The integer is used to generate a new k at
set intervals. This ensures that the signatures are additive and
secure against attacks. At the start of each round, each sensor
choses a private key and computes the appropriate public key.
Choosing a private key is straightforward and requires the
sensor to pick an integer in the ﬁeld of the elliptic curve.
The public key is generated by multiplying the base point T
with the private key; the result is another point on the curve.
A new public/private key pair is necessary during each round
of processing because it would only take two signatures for a
malicious node to determine another node’s private key. Let’s
say that node A signs a message ma. The signature would be
k−1(ma + za ∗ r(x)). Any other node would know k−1 as
well as r(x) that would leave two unknowns ma,the message
and za, the private key. Clearly, if another message is signed
with the same private key, that signature would not be secure.
We add another level of security by signing the message and
then encrypting it before sending it to the next level. If a
sensor signs the same message with the same key, another
sensor would be able to determine the private key. In most
sensor applications, it’s likely that a sensor would generate the
same message several times. Each sensor computes R, which
is the base point T multiplied by the current random integer k.
Additionally, each sensor computes the multiplicative inverse
of k mod p. Each sensor can now generate its unique signature
si. After the signature has been generated, the sensor proceeds
to homomorphically encrypt its reading xi. The sensor ﬁrst
maps its reading onto the elliptic curve. After the mapping
the reading is encrypted using the EC-IES algorithm [15].
If the sensor receives messages from other nodes for for-
warding, it combines them according to the algorithm. The
signature scheme is designed such that all signatures can be
combined via simple arithmetic. This makes the amount of
work required from a parent very small and thus well suited
for wireless sensor networks.
We will now describe the base station’s algorithm. The base
station receives the sum of the signatures, the sum of the
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SUM-SIG(223) 
SUM-PK(42, 42)
B
Enc(23), Sig(23), PK(5,2)
Enc(5), Sig(5), PK(8, 10)
SUM-ENC=ENC(62)
SUM-SIG(62)
SUM-PK(18, 10) 
Enc(16), Sig(16), PK(6, 12)
Enc(18), Sig(18), PK(13, 10)
Base 
Station
Dec(Enc(223) = 223
SIG(Dec(Enc(223)) = SUM-SIG(223)
Enc(12), Sig(12), PK(6,6)
Enc(22), Sig(22), PK(10, 19)
Enc(2), Sig(2), PK(5,13)
Enc(3), Sig(3), PK(10,12)
Enc(31), Sig(31), PK(15, 20)
SUM-ENC = ENC(70) 
SUM-SIG(70)
SUM-PK(12, 25)
A
Enc(9), Sig(9), PK(19, 10)
Enc(4), Sig(4), PK(4,1)
Enc(43), Sig(43), PK(22, 28)
Enc(35), Sig(35), PK(5, 19)
C
SUM-ENC=ENC(91)
SUM-SIG(91) 
SUM-PK(51, 42)
Fig. 1. Homomorphic Encryption Example
Require: Elliptic Curve Parameters D = (q, FR, a, b, T, p ,
h), sensor reading mi,p r i v a t ek e yzi, base station public
key Q, a network wide random integer k
1: Each sensor computes zi ∗ T =( x,y), its public key.
2: Each sensor computes R =( r(x),r(y)) = k ∗ T.
3: Each sensor computes k−1 mod p.
4: Each sensor computes si = k−1(mi + zi ∗ r(x)) mod p.
5: Each sensor’s signature for the message mi is si.
6: Each sensor maps its reading mi onto the elliptic curve
D.
7: Each sensor generates ciphertext mi = enc(mi)
8: if Sensor is a parent then
9: The sensor combines the signatures into s =

si)
10: The sensor combines all ciphertexts into one ciphertext 
mi
11: end if
Fig. 2. HAgg: Sensor Algorithm
appropriate public keys and the homomorphically encrypted
aggregate result. The base station can now verify that the
same sensors that contributed to the aggregate also signed their
inputs and that signature is included in the combined signature.
The base station ﬁrst decrypts the aggregate result using its
private key. Additionally, the base station needs to reverse the
mapping from the point on the elliptic curve to the aggregate
result. To verify the signature, the base station calculates a
point on the curve using the received signature, the decrypted
aggregate result and the integer k. If the x-coordinate of the
point calculated is the same as r(x), the signature is veriﬁed.
The base station is now assured that no data not generated by
a legitimate sensor was included in the aggregate.
The algorithm described securely calculates the SUM of
the readings in a wireless sensor network. In order to securely
Require: Elliptic Curve Parameters D = (q, FR, a, b, T, p ,
h), sum of encrypted sensor readings m =

mi, sum of
the signatures s =

si, base station private key qi,s u m
of public keys Z, a network wide random integer k
1: Decrypt ciphertext

mi =

mi
2: Map reading m from the elliptic curve D into plaintext.
3: Compute R =( r(x),r(y)) = k ∗ T.
4: Compute w = s−1 mod p.
5: Compute u1 = mw mod p.
6: Compute u2 = r(x)w mod p.
7: Compute X = u1T + u2Z.
8: Compute v = X(x)m o dp.
9: if v == r then
10: The signature veriﬁed
11: end if
Fig. 3. HAgg: Base Station Algorithm
calculate the AVERAGE in a wireless sensor network, the base
station needs a count of the number of points included in the
SUM. With the knowledge of how many sensors contributed
to the aggregate, the AVERAGE can be calculated.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Our signature algorithm is an extension of the ECDSA.
ECDSA is assumed to be secure. ECDSA has been shown
to be secure under the assumption that the underlying group
is generic and that a collision resistant hash function has been
used.
Theorem 5.1: The signature produced by summing the indi-
vidual signatures will only verify if the contributing individual
signatures were produced by a valid node and the appropriate
public key was included in the sum of public keys.
We will now prove that the combined signature will only
verify if the individual signatures contributed by the nodes are
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The value k is a randomized, synchronized integer used by
all nodes in the network. We do not need to send r(x) with
each signature, as the base station is able to compute r(x).
Therefore the unique part of each node’s signature is si.
Lemma 5.2: The sum of the public keys equals the public
key generated from the sum of the private keys.
Proof: We have the sum of the public keys, Z = ZA +
ZB + .... Let’s say that the sum of the private keys, z =
zA+zB +.... Since ZA = zA∗T,ZB = zB ∗T,...we know
that
Z = zA ∗ T + zB ∗ T + ...
≡ (zA + zB + ...) ∗ T.
Therefore Z = zT. In other words, the sum of the public keys
equals the public key generated from the sum of the private
keys.
Lemma 5.3: The sum of signatures produced creates a valid
signature equivalent to a signature produced using the sum of
the private keys on the sum of the messages.
Proof: We know that m = mA + mB + ... and s =
sA + sB + ..., as per Algorithm 2. Then
s = k−1(mA + zAr(x)) + k−1(mB + zBr(x)) + ...
≡ k−1((mA + zAr(x)) + (mB + zBr(x)) + ...)
≡ k−1((mA + mB + ...)+( zA + zB + ...)r(x))
≡ k−1(m +( zA + zB + ...)r(x)).
Using Lemma 5.2, it follows that s = k−1(m + zr(x)).
We can now prove Theorem 5.1, that the signature veriﬁca-
tion of v == r will only work if each signer contributed the
signature and the matching public key to the aggregate.
Proof: From Lemma 5.3, we know that s = k−1(m +
zr(x)). Rearranging we get
k ≡ s−1(m + zr(x))
≡ s−1m + s−1r(x)z
≡ wm+ wr(x)z
≡ u1 + u2z mod p.
We also know that X = u1T + u2Z and that Z = zT;i t
follows that
X = u1T + u2Z
≡ u1T + u2(zT)
≡ (u1 + u2z)T
Thus (u1 + u2z)T ≡ kT and r == v as required for the
signature veriﬁcation.
VI. RELATED WORK
Secure data aggregation schemes have been of interest to
researchers. The earliest approaches focused on conﬁdentiality
of the data against a single aggregators. Algorithms which pre-
vented or detected multiple aggregators colluding to deceive
the base station were also introduced.
A new protocol for provably secure data aggregation in
wireless sensor networks was proposed in [16]. The algorithm
guarantees the detection of aggregate modiﬁcation by the
aggregator, except for those cases where the aggregator injects
data into the aggregate. The algorithm supports any arbitrary
tree structure and is resilient to any number of malicious nodes.
The algorithm focuses on the use of the SUM operator, but
would also work with MEDIAN, COUNT and AVERAGE.
This algorithm forces a commitment from the adversary at
intermediate nodes. Each sensor also veriﬁes that its data was
properly added to the aggregate. Our algorithm works with
any single-path routing protocol, and will securely calculate
the SUM and AVERAGE. Compared to the algorithm in [16],
our proposed algorithm provides for a greater reduction in
energy savings due to a reduced number of messages send.
The algorithms introduced in [17] achieve concealed data
aggregation. Concealment means that the data and the aggre-
gates are not readable for anyone who is not in possession of
the proper key. The algorithm uses privacy homomorphism to
achieve data hiding while still allowing for data aggregation.
The algorithm provides for data conﬁdentiality only; the
authors refer to other papers regarding solutions that provide
data integrity and authenticity. The algorithm uses symmetric
keys, while our work uses a private/public key approach.
The protocol introduced in [14] is not meant to provide
data authentication and message integrity during transmission.
Rather it is meant to provide persistent, secure data storage
in sensor networks. It provides for secure data replication
to ensure data availability in case of node failure. It also
introduces secure data aggregation due to restricted storage
space. Our work uses a similar public/private key homomor-
phic encryption protocol to ensure secure data aggregation
during transmission.
The work in [11] provides a survey of possible homomor-
phic public key encryption schemes suitable for wireless sen-
sor networks. The authors provide a list of desirable properties
of a homomorphic public key encryption scheme for wireless
sensor networks and evaluate the various candidates based on
that list. The authors conclude that EC-OU (Elliptic Curve
Okamoto-Uchiyama) and EC-EG (Elliptic Curve ElGamal) are
the two algorithms most suitable for use as homomorphic
public key encryption schemes. For our implementation we
have chosen EC-IES, a variant of EC-EG.
For the work in [18], the authors propose a new additively
homomorphic stream cipher suitable for wireless sensor net-
works. The proposed algorithms use a symmetric key stream.
In addition to the issues related to symmetric key use, the
base station needs to know exactly which sensor did or did
not contribute data to the aggregate. Without this information
the base station will be unable to decrypt the result. Only data
conﬁdentiality is provided with this algorithm. Our algorithm
provides both data conﬁdentiality and message integrity with-
out the limitations of symmetric key cryptography.
The authors in [19] provide a symmetric key algorithms
which provides data conﬁdentiality and integrity. The protocol
provides security against data injection by attackers during
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ensuring that a compromised node is will only reveal the
readings of a small subset of the nodes in the network.
Additionally, data injection attempts can be detected and the
algorithm is highly resilient to node failure. Our algorithm
on the other hand provides security using public/private key
cryptography as well as conﬁdentiality and integrity using
digital signatures.
The proposed algorithm in [20] provides data conﬁdentiality
in WSNs. The authors show that in WSNs two types of
data conﬁdentiality are necessary: generic conﬁdentiality and
end-to-end conﬁdentiality. Generic conﬁdentiality means that
any node not participating in the aggregation mechanism is
not able to access the data. End-to-end conﬁdentiality means
that any node participating in the aggregation mechanism is
unable to access the already aggregated data. The proposed
protocol provides security for both types of conﬁdentiality
using symmetric key cryptography and multiple homomorphic
encryption. Our algorithm on the other hand uses public key
cryptography and provides both types of conﬁdentiality as well
as data integrity.
In [21] the authors propose an algorithm which provides
for secure calculation of max/min and average on encrypted
data. Most homomorphic encryption schemes are not secure
against ciphertext only attacks when comparison functions
such as max/min and average are calculated. The algorithm
improves OPES which is computationally expensive. The
protocol provides for data conﬁdentiality during aggregate
computation of max/min and average. On the other hand, our
algorithm allows for the calculation of sum and provides for
data integrity as well.
As far as we can determine, this is the ﬁrst work which
used additively digital signatures in wireless sensor networks.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper a novel algorithm is presented to address
the problem of secure data aggregation in wireless sensor
networks. We apply a homomorphic encryption algorithm to
the messages to achieve data conﬁdentiality while allowing in-
network aggregation. An additively digital signature algorithm
based on ECDSA is used to achieve integrity of the aggregate.
We showed that the signature algorithm is as secure as
ECDSA. Future work will include implementing this algorithm
in TinyOS/TOSSIM [22].
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